这是一本投资实务领域的世界级和世纪级的经典著作，自从1949年首次出版以来，本书即成为股市上的《圣经》。
本杰明•格雷厄姆（Benjamin Graham，1894～1976年）美国经济学家和投资思想家，投资大师， “现代证券分析之父”， 价值投资理论奠基人。格雷厄姆生于伦敦，成长于纽约，毕业于哥伦比亚大学。著有《证券分析》(1934年)和《聪明的投资者》(1949年)，这两本书被公认为“划时代的、里程碑式的投资圣经”，至今仍极为畅销。格雷厄姆是沃伦•巴菲特就读哥伦比亚大学经济学院的研究生导师

华尔街有两条古老的谚语，对这种出售股票的行为给予了忠告：
一、”The trees do not grow up to the sky“，树高不过天——任何事都有一个限度
二、”Bulls make money, bears make money, pigs get slaughtered“，牛市能赚钱，熊市能赚钱，但猪市(被宰)从来也赚不到钱

本书的目的，是为普通人在投资策略的选择和执行方面提供相应的指导。

这本书主要直接写给两类人:“防御型投资者”和“进攻型投资者”。是防御型还是进攻型：过往业绩是否超出市场平均5%的收益
投资建议
当“感觉市场已处于危险的高位时”，将股票持有比例减少到25%；并在他”感到股价的下跌已使其吸引力与日俱增时”，将持股量提升到最大限度，即75%比例

选择普通股的优点：  
1、股票很大程度上使投资者免受通货膨胀损失 
2、它可以为投资者提供较高的多年平均回报 

投资的中心思想：
要有安全边际magin of safety
分散化原则
区别投资与投机，最有条不紊的公司就是最明智的投资
同时要避免以过高的价格买进股票
另外择时进场，在市场低迷下跌时候买入、上涨至高位时卖出这一策略的可能性和限制性；
市场所发生的各种波动虽然波动范围较大，但是想通过利用这种波动来交易获得需要一种特殊的才能或者感觉。

投资的一般方法

防御型投资者

它将有助于防御型投资者保存资本，避免严重的委托失误，得到相当的收益回报，在某种程序上防止通货膨胀。
> 买入一只地位稳固投资基金的股份，以替代自己选股
> 资金大可以聘用投资公司
> “美元平均法”，每月或季度固定投入资金买股票，比例在25%~75%，根据股市的动向反向操作，这种叫“程式投资”（formula investing）
另外，它可使进攻型投资者利用许多经常发生的机会，借助于足够的分析，以低于公正价格或内在价值的购买证券。

防御型投资股票选择：

  1. Adequate size.
  2. A sufficiently strong financial condition.
  3. Continued dividends for at least the past 20 years.
  4. No earnings deficit in the past ten years.
  5. Ten-year growth of at least one-third in per-share earnings.
  6. Price of stock no more than 1½ times net asset value.
  7. Price no more than 15 times average earnings of the past three years.

进攻型投资者的组合策略

　我给出5种标准方法，进攻型投资者可用来赚取超额利润。

  1. 普通交易──全面参与市场活动，就像“平均指数”反应的那样。
  2. 有选择的交易──选择在一年左右时间中比一般股票在市场上表现更好的证券。
  3. 买低卖高──当价格及行情较不乐观时入市，等到两者都上升时卖出。
  4. 长线选择──选择将来比一般企业更成功的公司（这些股票常被称作为“成长型股”）。
  5. 廉价购买──购买那些经可靠的方法衡量，价格大大低于它们真实价值的证券。

对第三类投资者────将注意力放在工业和公司预期重大变化的人，这本书可能只有很少的用处。

通用组合策略

普通股的的原则：

适当但不要分散化，限制在最少10只，最多30只
挑选的每一家公司应该是大型、知名、在财务上稳健的
每家公司都有长期连续支付股息的历史，至少10年以上
应该将买入的股票限制在市盈率范围内，以过去7年平均为基准，控制在25倍以内。成长股都除外

  1. There should be adequate though not excessive diversification. This might mean a minimum of ten different issues and a maximum of about thirty.†
  2. Each company selected should be large, prominent, and conservatively financed. Indefinite as these adjectives must be, their general sense is clear. Observations on this point are added at the end of the chapter.
  3. Each company should have a long record of continuous dividend payments. (All the issues in the Dow Jones Industrial Aver age met this dividend requirement in 1971.) To be specific on this point we would suggest the requirement of continuous dividend payments beginning at least in 1950.*
  4. The investor should impose some limit on the price he will pay for an issue in relation to its average earnings over, say, the past seven years. We suggest that this limit be set at 25 times such average earnings, and not more than 20 times those of the last twelve-month period. But such a restriction would eliminate nearly all the strongest and most popular companies from the portfolio. In particular, it would ban virtually the entire category of “growth stocks,” which have for some years past been the favorites of both speculators and institutional investors. We must give our reasons for proposing so drastic an exclusion.

普通股条件：
1. Buying in low markets and selling in high markets
2. Buying carefully chosen “growth stocks”  (成长股方法, 成长股可以定义为那些在过去比别的股票表现好，且可以预期将来也能比别的股票表现好的股票。聪明的投资者应该集中优选成长股)
3. Buying bargain issues of various types
4. Buying into “special situations”

普遍的市场策略——择时
在市场低迷下跌时候买入、上涨至高位时卖出这一策略的可能性和限制性
市场所发生的各种波动虽然波动范围较大，但是想通过利用这种波动来交易获得需要一种特殊的才能或者感觉。
我们为防御型投资者提供的50%-50%投资方案是我们能够提供给所有投资者的、可用于 1972 年的、最具体或最省事的方案

我们认为股票配比 25%的最低限度和 75%的最高限度依然可以有很大的弹性
随着时代的变迁这些方法似乎已经过时了，而且要根据1949年以来股市的运行模式来判断新的买卖水平似乎毫无意义。这期间的时间太短，无法对未来操作提供任何可靠的指导

成长股方法

格雷厄姆认为五个因素是决定性的。他总结如下：

the company’s “general long-term prospects” 公司的“总体长期前景”
the quality of its management 其管理质量
its financial strength and capital structure 其财务实力和资本结构
its dividend record 其股息记录
and its current dividend rate. 以及其当前股息率。

The term “growth stock” is applied to one which has increased its per-share earnings in the past at well above the rate for common stocks generally and is expected to continue to do so in the future. (Some authorities would say that a true growth stock should be expected at least to double its per-share earnings in ten years—i.e., to increase them at a compounded annual rate of over 7.1%.)
“成长股”一词指过去每股收益的增长率远远高于普通股的增长率，预计未来将继续如此。（一些权威人士认为，真正的成长型股票在十年内每股收益应至少翻一番，即以超过7.1%的复合年增长率增长。）

There are two catches to this simple idea. The first is that common stocks with good records and apparently good prospects sell at correspondingly high prices. The investor may be right in his judgment of their prospects and still not fare particularly well, merely because he has paid in full (and perhaps overpaid) for the expected prosperity.
第一，具有好的历史经营记录和明显良好前景的股票，其价格已经比较高了。投资者在成长性的判断上可能对了，但未必可以获得好的投资收益,原因在于买入价格已经充分反映了或已经过度反应了这种预期。
The second is that his judgment as to the future may prove wrong. Unusually rapid growth cannot keep up forever; when a company has already registered a brilliant expansion, its very increase in size makes a repetition of its achievement more difficult. At some point the growth curve flattens out, and in many cases it turns downward.
第二，他对前景的判断也可能出错。一般情况下，快速成长无法长期保持，永无终止；若一个企业录得快速增长，待体量增加以后，再想保持以往的增长速度就困难了。在某一位置，增长曲线就会横向移动而不再向上，有时候甚至会下行
The more enthusiastic the public grows about it, and the faster its advance as compared with the actual growth in its earnings, the riskier a proposition it becomes.
公众对它的热情越高，与收益的实际增长相比，它的发展速度越快，这一命题的风险就越大。
Like spacecraft that pick up speed as they rise into the Earth’s stratosphere, growth stocks often seem to defy gravity.
就像太空船在上升到地球平流层时加速一样，成长型股票似乎常常无视重力。
Growth stocks are worth buying when their prices are reasonable, but when their price/earnings ratios go much above 25 or 30 the odds get ugly
当成长型股票的价格合理时，它们值得购买，但当它们的市盈率远高于25或30时，情况就变得糟糕了

Ps：以上信息从以下两个版本摘抄：
中文原版：《聪明的投资者(原本第四版) (格雷厄姆) 》
英文原版：The Intelligent Investor, Rev. - Benjamin Graham